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Abstract
Propaganda campaigns aim at influencing people’s
mindset with the purpose of advancing a specific
agenda. They exploit the anonymity of the Internet,
the micro-profiling ability of social networks, and
the ease of automatically creating and managing
coordinated networks of accounts, to reach millions
of social network users with persuasive messages,
specifically targeted to topics each individual user
is sensitive to, and ultimately influencing the out-
come on a targeted issue. In this survey, we review
the state of the art on computational propaganda de-
tection from the perspective of Natural Language
Processing and Network Analysis, arguing about
the need for combined efforts between these com-
munities. We further discuss current challenges and
future research directions.
1 Introduction
The Web makes it possible for anybody to create a website or
a blog and to become a news medium. Undoubtedly, this is a
hugely positive development as it elevates freedom of expres-
sion to a whole new level, giving anybody the opportunity to
make their voice heard. With the rise of social media, every-
one can reach out to a very large audience, something that
until recently was only possible for major news outlets.
However, this new avenue for self-expression has brought
also unintended consequences, the most evident one being
that the society has been left unprotected against potential
manipulation from a multitude of sources. The issue be-
came of general concern in 2016, a year marked by micro-
targeted online disinformation and misinformation at an un-
precedented scale, primarily in connection to Brexit and the
US Presidential campaign; then, in 2020, the COVID-19 pan-
demic also gave rise to the first global infodemic. Spread-
ing disinformation disguised as news created the illusion that
the information was reliable, and thus people tended to lower
their natural barrier of critical thinking compared to when in-
formation came from different types of sources.
∗Contact Author
Whereas false statements are not really a new phenomenon
—e.g., yellow press has been around for decades— this time
things were notably different in terms of scale and effective-
ness thanks to social media, which provided both a medium to
reach millions of users and an easy way to micro-target spe-
cific narrow groups of voters based on precise geographic,
demographic, psychological, and/or political profiling.
An important aspect of the problem that is often largely
ignored is the mechanism through which disinformation
is being conveyed, which is using propaganda techniques.
These include specific rhetorical and psychological tech-
niques, ranging from leveraging on emotions —such as us-
ing loaded language, flag waving, appeal to authority, slo-
gans, and cliche´s— to using logical fallacies —such as straw
men (misrepresenting someone’s opinion), red herring (pre-
senting irrelevant data), black-and-white fallacy (presenting
two alternatives as the only possibilities), and whataboutism.
Moreover, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that propa-
ganda does not necessarily have to lie; it could appeal to emo-
tions or cherry-pick the facts. Thus, we believe that specific
research on propaganda detection is a relevant contribution in
the fight against online disinformation.
Here, we focus on computational propaganda, which is
defined as “propaganda created or disseminated using com-
putational (technical) means” [Bolsover and Howard, 2017].
Traditionally, propaganda campaigns had been a monopoly
of state actors, but nowadays they are within reach for
various groups and even for individuals. One key ele-
ment of such campaigns is that they often rely on coordi-
nated efforts to spread messages at scale. Such coordina-
tion is achieved by leveraging botnets (groups of fully au-
tomated accounts) [Zhang et al., 2016], cyborgs (partially
automated) [Chu et al., 2012] and troll armies (human-
driven) [Linvill and Patrick, 2018], known as sockpuppets
[Kumar et al., 2017], Internet water army [Chen et al., 2013],
astroturfers [Ratkiewicz et al., 2011], and seminar users
[Darwish et al., 2017]. Thus, a promising direction to thwart
propaganda campaigns is to discover such coordination; this
is demonstrated by recent interest by Facebook1 and Twitter2.
1newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/inside-feed-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/
2https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation
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In order for propaganda campaigns to work, it is critical
that they go unnoticed. This further motivates work on de-
tecting and exposing propaganda campaigns, which should
make them increasingly inefficient. Given the above, in the
present survey, we focus on computational propaganda from
two perspectives: (i) the content of the propaganda messages
and (ii) their propagation in social networks.
Finally, it is worth noting that, even though there have been
several recent surveys on fake news detection [Shu at al.,
2017; Zhou et al., 2019], fact-checking [Thorne and Vlachos,
2018], and truth discovery [Li et al., 2016], none of them fo-
cuses on computational propaganda. There has also been a
special issue of the Big Data journal on Computational Pro-
paganda and Political Big Data [Bolsover and Howard, 2017],
but it did not include a survey. Here we aim to bridge this gap.
2 Propaganda
The term propaganda was coined in the 17th century, and ini-
tially referred to the propagation of the Catholic faith in the
New World [Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 2]. It soon took
a pejorative connotation, as its meaning was extended to also
mean opposition to Protestantism. In more recent times, back
in 1938, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis [Ins, 1938],
defined propaganda as “expression of opinion or action by in-
dividuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opin-
ions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference
to predetermined ends”.
Recently, Bolsover et. al [2017] dug deeper into this def-
inition identifying its two key elements: (i) trying to influ-
ence opinion, and (ii) doing so on purpose. Influencing opin-
ions is achieved through a series of rhetorical and psycho-
logical techniques. Clyde R. Miller in 1937 proposed one
of the seminal categorizations of propaganda, consisting of
seven devices [Ins, 1938], which remain well accepted to-
day [Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p.237]: name calling, glit-
tering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card
stacking, and bandwagon. Other scholars consider catego-
rizations with as many as eighty-nine techniques [Conserva,
2003], and Wikipedia lists about seventy techniques.3 How-
ever, these larger sets of techniques are essentially subtypes
of the general schema proposed in [Ins, 1938].
Propaganda is different from disinformation4, in particular
with reference to the truth value of the managed information
and its goal, which in disinformation are (i) false, and (ii) in-
tending to harm, respectively. The (often-neglected) intention
to harm popped up in 2016, due to both the Brexit referendum
and the US Presidential elections, when society and academia
discovered that the news cycle got weaponized by disinforma-
tion. Contrarily, propaganda can hook to claims that are either
true or false, and its intended objectives can be either harmful
or harmless (even good5). In practice, propaganda and dis-
information are used synergetically to achieve specific objec-
tives, effectively turning social media into a weapon. Another
related concept is that of “fake news”, where the focus is on
a piece of information being factually false.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda techniques
4http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/countering-disinformation en
5Think of Greta Thunberg’s highly propagandistic speech at the UN in 2019.
Although lying and creating fake stories is considered as
one of the propaganda techniques (some authors refer to it as
“black propaganda” [Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012]), there are
contexts where this course of actions is often done without
pursuing the objective to influence the audience, as in satire
and clickbaiting. These special cases are of less interest when
it comes to fighting the weaponization of social media, and
are therefore considered out of the scope for this survey.
3 Text Analysis Perspective
Research on propaganda detection based on text analysis has
a short history, mainly due to the lack of suitable annotated
datasets for training supervised models. There have been
some relevant initiatives, where expert journalists or volun-
teers analyzed entire news outlets, which could be used for
training. For example, Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC)6
is an independent organization analyzing media in terms of
their factual reporting, bias, and propagandist content, among
other aspects. Similar initiatives are run by US News &
World Report7 and the European Union.8 Such data has been
used in distant supervision approaches [Mintz et al., 2009],
i.e., by assigning each article from a given news outlet the
label propagandistic/non-propagandistic using the label for
that news outlet. Unfortunately, such coarse approximation
inevitably introduces noise to the learning process, as we dis-
cuss in Section 5.
In the remainder of this section, we review current work on
propaganda detection from a text analysis perspective. This
includes the production of annotated datasets, characterizing
entire documents, and detecting the use of propaganda tech-
niques at the span level.
3.1 Available Datasets
Given that existing models to detect propaganda in text are
supervised, annotated corpora are necessary. Table 1 shows
an overview of the available corpora (to the best of our knowl-
edge), with annotation both at the document and at the frag-
ment level.
Rashkin et al. [2017] released TSHP-17, a balanced cor-
pus with document-level annotation including four classes:
trusted, satire, hoax, and propaganda. TSHP-17 belongs to
the collection of datasets annotated via distant supervision: an
article is assigned to one of the classes if the outlet that pub-
lished it is labeled as such by the US News & World Report.
The documents were collected from the English Gigaword
and from seven unreliable news sources.
According to Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al. [2019] the low amount
of sources considered per class is a downside of TSHP-17,
as the systems trained on it might be modeling the news out-
lets, rather than propaganda itself (or any of the other three
classes). To cope with this limitation, Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al.
released QProp a twice-as-big binary imbalanced dataset in
which ∼ 10% of the articles belong to class propaganda.
6http://mediabiasfactcheck.com
7www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-11-14/avoid-these-fake-
news-sites-at-all-costs
8www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-11-14/avoid-these-fake-
news-sites-at-all-costs; http://euvsdisinfo.eu/
Corpus Level Sources Classes Articles Prop.
TSHP-17 document 11 (2) 4 22,580 5,330
QProp document 104 (10) 2 51,294 5,737
PTC text span 49 (13) 18 451 7,385
Table 1: Textual datasets available to train supervised propaganda
identification models at different granularity levels.
Once again, the annotation in QProp is obtained by distant
supervision; this time with information from MBFC. Aside
the binary propaganda vs. trustworthy annotation, in QProp
each article has associated metadata from its source such as
the bias level (e.g., left, center, right) from MBFC and ge-
ographical information, average sentiment, publication date,
identifier, author, and official source name from GDELT.9
However, both TSHP-17 and QProp lack information about
the precise location of a propagandist snippet within a doc-
ument. Since propaganda is conveyed by using specific
rhetoric and psychological techniques, a separate line of
research recently aimed to identify the use of such tech-
niques. In particular, Da San Martino et al. [2019b] pro-
posed a dataset with assets that previously available resources
lacked. First, their PTC corpus is manually judged by pro-
fessional annotators, rather than using distant supervision.
Second, the annotation is at the fragment level: specific text
spans are flagged, rather than full documents. Third, it goes
deeper into the types of propaganda, considering 18 propa-
ganda techniques, rather than the binary propaganda vs. non-
propaganda setting. The curated list of techniques is summa-
rized in Table 2. Whereas the volume of PTC is way lower
than that of TSHP-17and QProp —a few hundred articles
against thousands— it contains more than 7,000 propagandist
snippets. See Figure 1 for an example with annotations.
Another relevant line of research is on computational argu-
mentation, which deals with some logical fallacies considered
to be propaganda techniques. Habernal et al. [2017] described
a corpus with 1.3k arguments annotated with five fallacies
such as ad hominem, red herring, and irrelevant authority.
3.2 Text Classification
Early approaches to propaganda identification are fairly
aligned to the produced corpora. Rashkin et al. [2017] defined
a classical four-classes text classification task: propaganda vs
trusted vs hoax vs satire, using the TSHP-17 dataset. Us-
ing word n-gram representation with logistic regression, they
found that their model performed well only on articles from
sources that the system was trained on.
Barro´n et al. [2019] used a binary classification setting: de-
tecting propaganda vs non-propaganda and experimented on
TSHP-17and QProp corpora. They ran a massive set of ex-
periments, investigating various representations, from writing
style and readability level to the presence of certain keywords,
together with logistic regression and SVMs, and confirmed
that using distant supervision, in conjunction with rich repre-
sentations, might encourage the model to predict the source,
rather than to discriminate propaganda from non-propaganda.
9https://www.gdeltproject.org/
Technique Definition
Name calling attack an object/subject of the propa-
ganda with an insulting label
Repetition repeat the same message over and over
Slogans use a brief and memorable phrase
Appeal to fear support an idea by instilling fear against
other alternatives
Doubt questioning the credibility of some-
one/something
Exaggeration/minimizat. exaggerate or minimize something
Flag-Waving appeal to patriotism or identity
Loaded Language appeal to emotions or stereotypes
Reduction ad hitlerum disapprove an idea suggesting it is pop-
ular with groups hated by the audience
Bandwagon appeal to the popularity of an idea
Casual oversimplifica-
tion
assume a simple cause for a complex
event
Obfuscation, inten-
tional vagueness
use deliberately unclear and obscure ex-
pressions to confuse the audience
Appeal to authority use authority’s support as evidence
Black&white fallacy present only two options among many
Thought terminating
cliche´s
phrases that discourage critical thought
and meaningful discussions
Red herring introduce irrelevant material to distract
Straw men refute argument that was not presented
Whataboutism charging an opponent with hypocrisy
Table 2: List of the 18 propaganda techniques and their definitions.
Figure 1: Text excerpt with annotated propaganda techniques.
They advocated for providing assurance that test data come
from news sources that were not used for training, and inves-
tigated what representations remain robust in such a setting.
3.3 Detecting the Use of Propaganda Techniques
Da San Martino et al. [2019b] defined two tasks, based on
annotations from the PTC dataset: (i) binary classification —
given a sentence in an article, predict whether any of the 18
techniques has been used in it; (ii) multi-label multi-class
classification and span detection task —given a raw text,
identify both the specific text fragments where a propaganda
technique is being used as well as the type of technique. Such
a fine-grained level of analysis may provide support and ex-
planations to the user on why an article has been judged as
propagandistic by an automatic system. The authors pro-
posed a multi-granularity deep neural network that modulates
the signal from the sentence-level task to improve the predic-
tion of the fragment-level classifier.
A shared task was held within the 2019 Workshop on
NLP4IF: censorship, disinformation, and propaganda10,
based on the PTC corpus and the task definitions above.
The best-performing models for both tasks used BERT-
based contextual representations. Other approaches used
contextual representations based on RoBERTa, Grover, and
ELMo, or context-independent representations based on lex-
ical, sentiment-based, readability, and TF-IDF features. En-
sembles were also popular. Further details are available in the
shared task overview paper [Da San Martino et al., 2019a].
4 Network Analysis Perspective
As seen in Section 3, the rhetoric techniques used for in-
fluencing readers’ opinions can be detected directly in the
text. Contrarily, identifying the intent behind a propaganda
campaign requires analysis that goes beyond individual texts,
involving (among others) classification of the social media
users that contributed to injecting and spreading propaganda
within a network. Thus, a necessary condition to detect
the intention to harm implies detecting malicious coordina-
tion (i.e., coordinated inauthentic behavior). Throughout the
years, this high-level task has been tackled in different ways.
4.1 Early Approaches
Early approaches for detecting malicious coordination were
based on classifying individual nodes in a network as either
malicious or legitimate. Then, clusters of malicious nodes
were considered to be acting in coordination. In other words,
the concept of coordination was not embedded within the
models, but it was added “a posteriori”. The vast majority of
these approaches are based on supervised machine learning
and each account under investigation was analyzed in isola-
tion. That is, given a group of accounts to analyze, the super-
vised technique was separately applied to each account of the
group, that in turn received a label assigned by the detector.
The key assumption of this body of work is that each mali-
cious account has features that make it clearly distinguishable
from legitimate ones. This approach to the task also revolved
around the application of off-the-shelf, general-purpose clas-
sification algorithms. Widely used algorithms include deci-
sion trees and random forests, SVMs, boosting and bagging
(e.g., Adaptive Boost and Decorate) and, more recently, deep
neural networks [Kudugunta and Ferrara, 2018].
The most widely known example of this kind of detectors,
is Botometer [Yang et al., 2019], a social bot detection sys-
tem. By leveraging more than 1,200 features for a social me-
dia account, it evaluates profile characteristics, social network
structure, the produced content (including sentiment expres-
sions), and temporal features. Botometer simultaneously ana-
lyzes multiple dimensions of suspicious accounts for spotting
bots. Instead, other systems solely rely on network character-
istics [Yang et al., 2015], textual content [Rangel and Rosso,
2019], or profile information [Lee and Kim, 2014]. These
latter systems are typically easier to game, since they only
analyze a single facet of the complex, evolving behavior of
bad online actors.
10http://www.netcopia.net/nlp4if/2019/
4.2 Evolving Threats
Despite having achieved promising initial results, these early
approaches had several limitations. First, the performance
of a supervised detector strongly depends on the availabil-
ity of a ground truth (training) dataset. In most cases, a real
ground truth is lacking and the labels are manually given by
human operators. Unfortunately, as of 2020, we still have
diverse and conflicting definitions of what a malicious ac-
count really is [Grimme et al., 2017], and humans have been
proven to suffer from annotation biases and to largely fail at
spotting sophisticated bots and trolls [Cresci et al., 2017].
To make matters worse, it has been demonstrated that ma-
licious accounts “evolve” (i.e., they change their characteris-
tics and behaviors) in an effort to evade detection by estab-
lished techniques [Cresci et al., 2017]. Nowadays, sophis-
ticated malicious accounts are using the same technological
weapons as their hunters —such as powerful AI techniques—
for generating credible texts (e.g., with GPT-2), profile pic-
tures (e.g., with StyleGAN)11, and videos (e.g., using deep-
fakes), thus dramatically increasing their capabilities of im-
personating real people, and hence of escaping detection.
4.3 Modern Approaches
The difficulties at detecting sophisticated bots and trolls with
early approaches lead to a new research trend whose primary
characteristic is to target groups of accounts as a whole, rather
than focusing on individual accounts. In recently proposed
detectors, coordination is considered a key feature to ana-
lyze, and it is modeled within the detectors themselves. The
rationale for this choice is that malicious accounts act in co-
ordination (e.g., sbots are often organized in botnets, trolls
form so-called troll armies) to amplify their effect [Zhang et
al., 2016]. Moreover, by analyzing large groups of accounts,
modern detectors also have more data to exploit for fueling
powerful AI algorithms [Sun et al., 2017]. The shift from
individual to group analysis was accompanied by another
shift from general-purpose machine learning algorithms, to
ad-hoc algorithms specifically designed for detecting coor-
dination. In other words, the focus shifted from feature en-
gineering to learning effective feature representations and of
designing brand-new and customized algorithms [Cai et al.,
2017]. Many modern detectors are also unsupervised or semi-
supervised, to overcome the generalization deficiencies of su-
pervised detectors that are severely limited by the availability
of exhaustive training datasets [Echeverrı`a et al., 2018].
Examples of such systems implement network-based tech-
niques, aiming at detecting suspicious account connectivity
patterns [Liu et al., 2017; Chetan et al., 2019; Pacheco et al.,
2020]. Coordinated behavior appears as near-fully connected
communities in graphs, dense blocks in adjacency matrices,
or peculiar patterns in spectral subspaces [Jiang et al., 2016].
Other techniques adopted unsupervised approaches for spot-
ting anomalous patterns in the temporal tweeting and retweet-
ing behaviors of groups of accounts —e.g., by computing
metrics of distance out of the accounts activity time series and
by subsequently account clustering [Chavoshi et al., 2016;
Mazza et al., 2019].
11https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-removes-accounts-ai-generated-photos/
The rationale behind such approaches is based on evidence
suggesting that human-driven and legitimate behaviors are in-
trinsically more heterogeneous than automated and inauthen-
tic ones [Cresci et al., 2020]. Consequently, a large cluster
of accounts with highly similar behavior might serve as a red
flag for coordinated inauthentic behavior. Distance (or simi-
larity) between account activity time series was computed via
dynamic time warping [Chavoshi et al., 2016], or as the Eu-
clidean distance between the feature vectors computed by an
LSTM autoencoder [Mazza et al., 2019]. More recently, other
authors investigated the usefulness of Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (IRL) for inferring the intent that drives the activity
of coordinated groups of malicious accounts. Inferring in-
tent and motivation from observed behavior has been exten-
sively studied in the framework of IRL, with the main goal
of finding the rewards behind an agent’s observed behavior.
The inferred rewards can then be used as features in super-
vised learning systems aimed at detecting malicious and co-
ordinated agents.
The switch from early to modern detectors demonstrated
that the approach (e.g., individual vs group-based, supervised
vs unsupervised) to the task of propaganda and malicious ac-
counts detection can have serious repercussions on detection
performance. However, some scientific communities natu-
rally tend to favor a specific approach. For example, the ma-
jority of techniques that perform network analysis (e.g., by
considering the social or interactions graph of the accounts)
are intrinsically group-based. More often than not, they are
also unsupervised. Contrarily, all techniques based on textual
analyses, such as those that solely rely on natural language
processing, are supervised detectors that analyze individual
accounts [Rangel and Rosso, 2019]. As a consequence, some
combinations of the cited approaches —above all, text-based
detectors that perform unsupervised group analysis— are al-
most unexplored. For the future, it would thus be advisable to
put efforts along the highlighted research directions that have
been mostly overlooked until now.
5 Lessons Learned
The main lesson from our analysis is that there is a disconnec-
tion between NLP and Network Analysis communities when
it comes to fighting Computational Propaganda, and therefore
combined approaches may lead to systems significantly out-
performing the current state of the art. A detailed analysis is
reported in the following.
5.1 Text Analysis Lessons
From a text analysis perspective, we see that there is a lack of
a suitable dataset for document-level propaganda detection.
The attempts to use distant supervision as a substitute, by
projecting labels from media to all the articles they have pub-
lished is problematic in many aspects, even when done care-
fully. Indeed, distant supervision inevitably introduces noise
in the learning process, as it is based on the wrong assump-
tion that all articles from a given source would be either pro-
paganda or non-propaganda. In reality, a propagandist source
could periodically post objective non-propagandist informa-
tion to boost its credibility.
Similarly, sources that are generally recognized as objec-
tive might occasionally post information that promotes a par-
ticular agenda. One way to deal with this issue might be to
devise advanced learning algorithms, such as Generative Ad-
versarial Networks (GANs), which can be trained to avoid
specific biases, i.e., modelling the article source. Another is-
sue with distant supervision is that while it is acceptable for
training, it cannot give a fair assessment of a system at testing
time, something that previous work has ignored.
Another lesson is that it seems more promising to focus
on detecting the use of fine-grained propaganda techniques in
text. Propaganda techniques are well-defined and well-known
in the literature, and thus it makes sense to focus on them, as
they are the very device on which propaganda is built. No-
tably, a proper dataset is already available for this new task,
it is of reasonable size (350K tokens, which compares well
to datasets for the related task of named entity recognition,
whose typical size is 200K tokens), and covers a wide range
of 18 commonly accepted techniques, comprising both vari-
ous kinds of appeal to emotions as well as logical fallacies.
5.2 Network Analysis Lessons
Typically, when scholars and OSN administrators identify
new coordinated behavior that goes undetected by existing
techniques, as a reaction they start the development of new
detectors. The implication of this reactive approach is that
improvements occur only some time after having collected
evidence of a new mischievous behavior. Bad actors thus
benefit from a large time span —the time needed to design,
develop, and deploy a new detector— during which they are
free to tamper with our online environments.
A second lesson learned is related to the use of machine
learning algorithms, the vast majority of which are designed
to operate in environments that are stationary and neutral.
Unfortunately, in the task of propaganda campaign detection
both assumptions are easily violated, yielding unreliable pre-
dictions and severely decreased performance [Goodfellow et
al., 2014]. Stationarity is violated by the mechanism of evo-
lution of malicious accounts, resulting in accounts exhibiting
different behavior and characteristics over time. Neutrality is
violated as well, since propaganda spreaders and bot masters
are actively trying to fool detectors. Consequently, the excep-
tional results in malicious accounts detection that we reported
in our papers might be actually largely exaggerated.
Adversarial machine learning may however mitigate both
previous issues, since the existence of adversaries is ac-
counted for by design. We could thus apply adversarial ma-
chine learning to study vulnerabilities of existing detectors
and the possible attacks the cited vulnerabilities could lead to,
before they have been exploited by the adversaries. Interest-
ingly, this paradigm has recently been applied for improving
bot detection as well as for fake news detection [Wu et al.,
2020; Zellers et al., 2019]. Finally, it is worth noting that all
tasks related to the detection of online deception, manipula-
tion, and automation —including, but not limited to, propa-
ganda campaign detection— are intrinsically adversarial.
6 Challenges and Future Forecasting
6.1 Major Challenges
Computational propaganda detection is still in its early stages
and the following challenges need to be addressed:
1. Text is not the only way to convey propaganda. Some-
times, pictures convey stronger messages than texts, as for
certain political memes. Thus, it is becoming increasingly
necessary to analyze multiple modalities of data (e.g., im-
ages, videos, speech). This is challenging because, even if
some research was conducted on how to effectively under-
stand cross-modal information in various domains, little
has been done on what information (provided by a given
modality) can be leveraged to detect propaganda.
2. Explainability is a desirable feature of propaganda detec-
tion systems in order to make them accepted at large. In
fact, it is crucial to be able to motivate decisions, espe-
cially controversial ones (e.g., banning of OSN accounts
or removal of posts/news). However, most of the recent
developments in propaganda and coordination detection
are based on deep learning, which lacks explanability —
for the short and medium term, at least.
3. In addition to being able to classify individual doc-
uments as propaganda or single accounts as decep-
tive/coordinated, it would be useful to also provide infor-
mation towards understanding the goals and the strategy
of propaganda campaigns [Atanasov et al., 2019]. This
problem currently stands as largely unsolved and calls for
joint efforts in propaganda and coordination detection.
4. Recent advances in neural language models have made it
difficult even for humans to detect synthetic text. Zellers
et al. [2019] showed that a template system helps manip-
ulate the output format of a language model, while Yang
et al. [2018] suggested how to transfer the style of the lan-
guage model to the target domain. With all building blocks
already in place, it is likely that automatically-generated
propaganda will surface in the near future.
5. The vast majority of existing detectors are evaluated only
on a single annotated dataset. Often, the dataset is col-
lected and annotated for a specific study, and is subse-
quently disregarded. As such, we currently lack the ability
to evaluate detectors’ capability of generalizing the perfor-
mance obtained in silico, also when applied in-the-wild.
For the future, it is advisable to devote additional efforts
to curate large annotated datasets. Extensive data sharing
initiatives —such as that of Twitter related to recent infor-
mation operations12— are thus particularly welcome.
6. When dealing with user-generated data, ethical considera-
tions are also important. We should thus guarantee that all
analysis and potential sharing of datasets are conducted
respecting the privacy of the involved users. This can
also affect data availability, as demonstrated by the Face-
book/Social Science One URL dataset13, whose release
was postponed for almost two years due to the need to
implement robust privacy-preserving mechanisms.
12http://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html
13http://socialscience.one/blog/unprecedented-facebook-urls-dataset-now-
available-research-through-social-science-one
6.2 Forecasting
Given the above challenges and the existence of some previ-
ously remarked under-explored directions, we highlight the
following research directions:
1. There is growing motivation for jointly tackling the tex-
tual and the network aspects of propaganda detection, as
relying on a single paradigm is a recipe for failure. For
instance, if a pre-trained language model such as GPT-2
is used as an automated propaganda generation method, it
may become ineffective to detect propaganda when focus-
ing on linguistic features alone, since it would take longer
to detect propaganda than to generate it. Thus, in the fu-
ture it will be necessary to go beyond texts and to also
analyze the network nodes and the connectivity patterns
through which propaganda spreads.
2. Spreading propaganda through multiple modalities is in-
creasingly popular. Maliciously crafted images or videos
can be more effective than articles when targeting the
millennial generation, who is more familiar with watch-
ing than reading. Again, research in detecting propa-
ganda needs to move beyond text analysis, and to embrace
more comprehensive analyses that span over various data
modalities.
7 Conclusion
Among the contributions of our work, we surveyed state-of-
the-art computational propaganda detection methodologies.
We also showed how the rapid pace of evolution of the tech-
niques adopted by an adversary are impairing current pro-
paganda detection solutions. Further, we justified our call
for moving beyond textual analysis and we argued for the
need of combined efforts blending Natural Language Pro-
cessing, Network Analysis, and Machine Learning. Finally,
we showed concrete promising research directions in the field
of computational propaganda detection.
References
[Atanasov et al., 2019] Atanasov et al. Predicting the role of
political trolls in social media. In CoNLL, pages 1023–
1034, 2019.
[Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019] Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al. Proppy:
Organizing the news based on their propagandistic con-
tent. Inf. Process. Manag., 56(5):1849–1864, 2019.
[Bolsover and Howard, 2017] Bolsover and Howard. Com-
putational propaganda and political big data: Toward a
more critical research agenda. Big Data, 5(4):273–276,
2017.
[Cai et al., 2017] Cai et al. Detecting social bots by jointly
modeling deep behavior and content information. In
CIKM, pages 1995–1998, 2017.
[Chavoshi et al., 2016] Chavoshi et al. DeBot: Twitter bot
detection via warped correlation. In ICDM, pages 817–
822, 2016.
[Chen et al., 2013] Chen et al. Battling the internet water
army: Detection of hidden paid posters. In ASONAM,
pages 116–120, 2013.
[Chetan et al., 2019] Chetan et al. Corerank: Ranking
to detect users involved in blackmarket-based collusive
retweeting activities. In WSDM, pages 330–338, 2019.
[Chu et al., 2012] Chu et al. Detecting automation of Twit-
ter accounts: Are you a human, bot, or cyborg? TDSC,
9(6):811–824, 2012.
[Conserva, 2003] Conserva. Propaganda Techniques. Au-
thorHouse, 2003.
[Cresci et al., 2017] Cresci et al. The paradigm-shift of so-
cial spambots: Evidence, theories, and tools for the arms
race. In WWW Companion, pages 963–972, 2017.
[Cresci et al., 2020] Cresci et al. Emergent properties, mod-
els, and laws of behavioral similarities within groups of
Twitter users. Comput. Commun., 150:47–61, 2020.
[Da San Martino et al., 2019a] Da San Martino et al. Find-
ings of the NLP4IF-2019 shared task on fine-grained pro-
paganda detection. In NLP4IF@EMNLP, pages 162–170,
2019.
[Da San Martino et al., 2019b] Da San Martino et al. Fine-
grained analysis of propaganda in news articles. In
EMNLP, pages 5640–5650, 2019.
[Darwish et al., 2017] Darwish et al. Seminar users in the
Arabic Twitter sphere. In SocInfo, pages 91–108, 2017.
[Echeverrı`a et al., 2018] Echeverrı`a et al. LOBO: Evaluation
of generalization deficiencies in Twitter bot classifiers. In
ACSAC, pages 137–146, 2018.
[Goodfellow et al., 2014] Ian Goodfellow et al. Generative
adversarial nets. In NIPS, pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[Grimme et al., 2017] Grimme et al. Social bots: Human-
like by means of human control? Big Data, 5(4):279–293,
2017.
[Habernal et al., 2017] Habernal et al. Argotario: Compu-
tational argumentation meets serious games. In EMNLP,
pages 7–12, 2017.
[Ins, 1938] How to detect propaganda. In Publications of the
Institute for Propaganda Analysis, pages 210–218. 1938.
[Jiang et al., 2016] Jiang et al. Inferring lockstep behavior
from connectivity pattern in large graphs. Knowledge and
Information Systems, 48(2):399–428, 2016.
[Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012] Jowett and O’Donnell. Pro-
paganda and Persuasion. SAGE, 2012.
[Kudugunta and Ferrara, 2018] Kudugunta and Ferrara.
Deep neural networks for bot detection. Information
Sciences, 467:312–322, 2018.
[Kumar et al., 2017] Kumar et al. An army of me: Sockpup-
pets in online discussion communities. In WWW, pages
857–866, 2017.
[Lee and Kim, 2014] Lee and Kim. Early filtering of
ephemeral malicious accounts on Twitter. Comput. Com-
mun., 54:48–57, 2014.
[Li et al., 2016] Li et al. A survey on truth discovery.
SIGKDD Explor. Newsl., 17(2):1–16, 2016.
[Linvill and Patrick, 2018] Linvill and Patrick. Troll facto-
ries: The Internet Research Agency and state-sponsored
agenda building. Resource Centre on Media Freedom in
Europe, 2018.
[Liu et al., 2017] Liu et al. HoloScope: Topology-and-spike
aware fraud detection. In CIKM, pages 1539–1548, 2017.
[Mazza et al., 2019] Mazza et al. RTbust: Exploiting tem-
poral patterns for botnet detection on Twitter. In WebSci,
pages 183–192, 2019.
[Mintz et al., 2009] Mintz et al. Distant supervision for re-
lation extraction without labeled data. In ACL–AFNLP,
pages 1003–1011, 2009.
[Pacheco et al., 2020] Pacheco et al. Unveiling coordinated
groups behind White Helmets disinformation. In WWW
Companion, pages 611–616, 2020.
[Rangel and Rosso, 2019] Rangel and Rosso. Overview of
the 7th author profiling task at PAN 2019: Bots and gender
profiling in Twitter. In CLEF, 2019.
[Rashkin et al., 2017] Rashkin et al. Truth of varying shades:
Analyzing language in fake news and political fact-
checking. In EMNLP, pages 2931–2937, 2017.
[Ratkiewicz et al., 2011] Ratkiewicz et al. Truthy: Mapping
the spread of astroturf in microblog streams. In WWW,
pages 249–252, 2011.
[Shu at al., 2017] Shu at al. Fake news detection on so-
cial media: A data mining perspective. SIGKDD Explor.
Newsl., 19(1):22–36, 2017.
[Sun et al., 2017] Sun et al. Revisiting unreasonable effec-
tiveness of data in deep learning era. In ICCV, pages 843–
852, 2017.
[Thorne and Vlachos, 2018] Thorne and Vlachos. Auto-
mated fact checking: Task formulations, methods and fu-
ture directions. In COLING, pages 3346–3359, 2018.
[Wu et al., 2020] Wu et al. Using improved conditional gen-
erative adversarial networks to detect social bots on Twit-
ter. IEEE Access, 8:36664–36680, 2020.
[Yang et al., 2015] Yang et al. VoteTrust: Leveraging friend
invitation graph to defend against social network sybils.
TDSC, 13(4):488–501, 2015.
[Yang et al., 2018] Yang et al. Unsupervised text style trans-
fer using language model discriminators. In NIPS, pages
7287–7298, 2018.
[Yang et al., 2019] Yang et al. Arming the public with arti-
ficial intelligence to counter social bots. Human Behavior
and Emerging Technologies, 1(1):48–61, 2019.
[Zellers et al., 2019] Zellers et al. Defending against neural
fake news. In NIPS, pages 9051–9062, 2019.
[Zhang et al., 2016] Zhang et al. The rise of social botnets:
Attacks and countermeasures. TDSC, 15(6):1068–1082,
2016.
[Zhou et al., 2019] Zhou et al. Fake news: Fundamental the-
ories, detection strategies and challenges. In WSDM, pages
836–837, 2019.
